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COST OF CURE DAMAGES AND THE RELEVANCE OF THE INJURED 





The aim of compensatory damages for breach of contract – by far the most common measure 
of damages – is to provide the injured promisee with the sum of money necessary to put him in 
the position that he would have been in had the contract been performed.1 Whilst this appears 
simple and has become trite law, the process of identifying and valuing the promisee’s loss can 
be complex.  
The focus of this article is on an aspect of this complexity that arises in relation to one 
of the two main measures of compensatory damages, cost of cure damages.2 This measure 
compensates the additional expenditure incurred by the injured promisee in order to obtain the 
performance that he bargained for. The issue concerns the extent to which, when deciding 
whether or not to make a cost of cure damages award, the courts take account of, and should 
take account of, what the injured promisee does or intends to do with the award. Can the injured 
promisee do with the award as he pleases? Or must he use or at least intend to use it to remedy 
the breach? To what extent, if at all, should these factors be relevant in assessing his recoverable 
loss?  
There are various ways in which the courts could tackle these questions. Possibilities 
include requiring that the breach be remedied or at least that the injured promisee intends to 
remedy the breach before making the award. It might even be that the award is made conditional 
upon the remedy being effected in the future. Alternatively, these enquiries could be dispensed 
with altogether and cost of cure damages made available regardless of whether the breach has 
been or will be remedied and of the promisee's intended use of the award. 
This article surveys the cases in which these questions have arisen and been addressed. 
These cases are well-known in relation to a number of legal principles but here are explored 
and reconciled with a focus only on how the court has dealt with the way that the injured 
promisee uses, or intends to use, his damages award.  
The first part of the article shows that, once an award of cost of cure damages is made, 
the courts have been steadfastly unwilling to monitor what becomes of it. However, this has 
not translated into a similar willingness, when considering whether or not to make the award, 
to disregard how the promisee intends to use it. On some occasions, the promisee's intended 
use of the award has been held to be relevant to whether the remedy should be available.  
A careful review of these cases reveals that the courts do not speak with one voice on 
the exact relevance of the promisee's intention. In fact, there appears to be subtle divergence as 
to the extent to which it should be taken into account. It has been held in some cases to be one 
relevant factor amongst others; in other cases, it has been seen as a precondition to recovery. 
This divergence has the potential to confuse and raises questions as to the proper role of 
intention in this context, yet this has given rise to surprisingly little literature or comment.  
The second part considers the implications of taking account of the promisee's intended 
use of a damages award. It shows that there are some advantages. More accurate compensation 
and avoiding the promisee obtaining an uncovenanted benefit are examples. However, the risk 
                                                          
* I would like to thank Gregg Rowan, the Editor of the Cambridge Law Journal, and the anonymous reviewers 
for their comments and suggestions on an earlier draft. 
1 Robinson v Harmann (1848) 1 Ex 850; 154 E.R. 363. 
2 The promisee's intention is irrelevant to the other main measure of compensatory damages, the 'difference in 
value measure', which compensates the difference between the value of the promised performance and the 
performance actually rendered. 
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of tension with other principles relating to damages is potentially problematic. Consideration 
is given to how this might be overcome and fair compensation still achieved.  
 
II. THE ABSENCE OF ANY FETTER ON THE USE OF DAMAGES 
  
The question of whether an injured promisee can dispose freely of a damages award, once 
made, gives rise to little disagreement. It is well-established that the courts will not interfere; 
the issue is res inter alios acta.3 The court does not monitor whether he spends the money in 
remedying the loss suffered or make awards that are conditional on him doing so.4 
This has several consequences. For the injured promisee, he cannot be called to account 
for how he uses his award. He can do with it as he pleases. If he so wishes, he can spend it on 
something entirely unrelated to the compensatory purpose for which it was made. The corollary 
for the defaulting promisor is that he cannot return to court to challenge how the promisee has 
spent the money. There is no 'clawing back' of a damages award, regardless of how it might 
have been used.5   
Several justifications for this approach have been advanced. One is that it brings 
resolution and certainty.6 Qualifying how an award can be used might sow the seeds for new 
disputes. No such problems attend awards made unconditionally and 'once and for all'.7 Another 
is simplicity: it avoids the possibility of further recourse to the court where the injured promisee 
disposes of his damages in a manner that is inconsistent with the terms of its judgment. Clawing 
back money that has already been spent could also give rise to practical problems. The principle 
is thus uncontroversial in England. 
 
III. THE INJURED PROMISEE'S INTENTION TO CURE THE BREACH 
 
Where damages are awarded on the cost of cure basis, the unwillingness of the courts to 
consider how the injured promisee disposes of his award does not extend to what, at the time 
the award is made, he intends to do with the money. His intention can be relevant to whether 
compensation is due and, if so, the amount. The effect is to put the subjective intention8 of the 
promisee at the time of the trial9 into issue. However, the precise extent of its relevance is not 
altogether clear.  
  
A. Intention to Cure as a Factor Relevant to Cost of Cure Damages Liability 
 
1. Three cases: Tito, Radford and Ruxley 
 
                                                          
3 Ruxley Electronics & Construction Ltd v Forsyth [1996] A.C. 344, 359 (Lord Jauncey); Darlington Borough 
Council v Wiltshier Northern Ltd [1995] 1 W.L.R. 68 (CA) 80 (Steyn LJ). 
4 Damages awards must be unconditional: Banbury v Bank of Montreal [1918] A.C. 626; Patel v Hooper & 
Jackson [1999] 1 W.L.R. 1792, 1800 (Nourse LJ); Scullion v Bank of Scotland Plc [2010] EWHC 2253 at [68]-
[80]; N. Andrews, M. Clarke, A. Tettenborn and G. Virgo, Contractual Duties: Performance, Breach, Termination 
and Remedies (London 2012) [21-103]-[21-105]. For inroads into this principle, mainly in personal injury and 
wrongful death cases, see H. McGregor, McGregor on Damages (19th ed London 2014) [38-004]-[38-012] and 
[50-046]. 
5 A. Burrows, Remedies for Torts and Breach of Contract (2nd edn. Oxford 2004) 222. 
6 Ibid., at 183. 
7 Patel v Hooper & Jackson [1999] 1 W.L.R. 1792, 1800 (Nourse LJ). 
8 It is the subjective intention of the promisee that is relevant: H. Beale (ed.) Chitty on Contracts, (32nd edn. London 
2015) at [26-036]; Latimer v Carney [2006] EWCA Civ 1417 at [24] (Arden LJ). 
9 Dean v Ainley [1987] 1 W.L.R. 1729, 1735 (Glidewell LJ); Dodd Properties (Kent) v Canterbury City Council 
[1980] 1 W.L.R. 433, 457 (Donaldson LJ). 
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The relevance of the injured promisee's intention to cure to the availability of cost of cure 
damages was considered, in varying levels of detail, in three well-known cases.10 A key issue 
in each was whether the promisee, who had not yet cured the breach, could recover the cost of 
doing so, despite this being much higher than the difference in value between the promised 
performance and the performance actually rendered. In resolving this issue, the courts 
examined and took account of his intention. If he intended to cure the breach, that weighed in 
favour of a cost of cure award. If he did not, this had the opposite effect.  
The first case is Tito v Waddell (No 2),11 in which the defendant failed to comply with 
a contractual obligation to replant trees and shrubs on an island after completing mining 
operations. Megarry VC declined to award the cost of replanting or grant specific performance. 
The prohibitive cost and the absence of any material benefit to the promisees, who had moved 
to a different island and shown no intention of undertaking the work, meant that either remedy 
would be 'an order of futility and waste'.12 Instead, the claimants were confined to difference in 
value damages. On whether the claimants had already cured or intended to cure the breach, he 
said: 'if the plaintiff … has no intention of applying any damages towards carrying out the work 
contracted for, or its equivalent, I cannot see why he should recover the cost of doing the work 
which will never be done'.13  
Radford v De Froberville,14 decided shortly after Tito, followed this approach and 
confirmed that the intention of the injured promisee to carry out remedial work is relevant in 
deciding the extent of his loss. The question was whether the promisee could obtain damages 
representing the cost of building the wall, which the promisor had failed to erect in breach of 
contract.  
Oliver J thought the answer depended mainly on whether the promisee genuinely and 
seriously intended to undertake the work and, if so, the reasonableness of this course of action.15 
On the facts, the judge was satisfied that the promisee did so intend and that this was reasonable. 
The promisee wanted the wall to preserve the privacy of his land. Nothing less than building a 
wall would give him the bargained-for performance.16 His loss was genuine and the breach was 
not being used to secure an uncovenanted benefit.17 Cost of cure damages were therefore 
awarded. 
The relevance of the injured promisee's intention to cure was confirmed at the highest 
level in the leading case, Ruxley Electronics v Forsyth.18 In breach of a contractual provision 
that a swimming pool should have a maximum depth of 7 feet 6 inches, the promisor, a building 
contractor, built the pool to a maximum depth of 6 feet. The House of Lords refused to assess 
damages on the cost of cure basis. It found that demolishing the pool and building a new pool 
to the specified depth was out of proportion to the benefit that would accrue to the promisee. It 
would therefore be unreasonable.  
Lord Lloyd and Lord Jauncey considered the significance of whether the promisee, Mr 
Forsyth, intended to cure the breach. This was in their view relevant to the reasonableness of 
the cost of cure measure. It went directly to the extent of the promisee's loss: if he did not intend 
to rebuild, then he had not actually suffered the cost of carrying out the work as loss. He was 
                                                          
10 For a more detailed review of these three cases and the issues that they raise in this context, see Burrows (n 5) 
at 222. 
11 [1977] Ch 106. 
12 Ibid., at 327. 
13 Ibid., 332-333. 
14 [1977] 1 W.L.R. 1262. 
15 Ibid., at 1283. See also East Ham Corporation v Bernard Sunely & Sons [1966] A.C. 406, 434. 
16 Ibid., at 1268 and 1284. 
17 Ibid., at 1270. 
18 [1996] A.C. 344 (HL). 
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found not to intend to destroy and rebuild the pool. This meant that he had lost nothing except 
the difference in value.19 He was confined to a modest award of £2,500 for loss of amenity.  
 
2. Intention to cure as a stand-alone requirement or a factor going to reasonableness 
 
The thread running through these three cases is that the need for an intention to cure the breach 
and a more general requirement of reasonableness acted as limits upon the entitlement of the 
injured promisee to recover cost of cure damages. In Tito and Radford, an intention to cure was 
regarded as a stand-alone requirement separate from reasonableness.20 It appears to have been 
a necessary ingredient for an award of cost of cure damages to be made. In Ruxley, both Tito 
and Radford were expressly approved but the role of intention appears to have been at least 
slightly reduced;21 it was said to be a factor amongst others going to the reasonableness of a 
cost of cure award, not a requirement in its own right.  
This subtle departure from the approach in Tito and Radford was not recognised or 
explained by the House of Lords in Ruxley and the reason for it is unclear. The main focus was 
on the reasonableness of cost of cure damages and factors relevant to this issue other than 
whether the promisee intended to cure; the relevance of his intention was not discussed at any 
length.22 The two judges who did consider intention said little more than that it is a factor 
relevant to the reasonableness of the cost of cure measure.  
A possible reason for the divergence is that these judges, Lord Jauncey and Lord Lloyd, 
were seeking to minimise the tension between the role of the promisee's intention to cure the 
breach and the principle that how he uses his award is res inter alios acta. Both noted this 
tension and tried to reconcile the two principles. Lord Jauncey said:  
 
I should emphasise that in the normal case the court has no concern with the 
use to which a plaintiff puts an award of damages for a loss which has been 
established … Intention, or lack of it, to reinstate can have relevance only 
to the reasonableness and hence to the extent of the loss which has been 
sustained. Once that loss has been established intention as to the subsequent 
use of the damages ceases to be relevant.23  
 
In this way, the principles were seen as co-existing without being contradictory. 
Whatever the reason, the reduced significance given to whether the promisee intends to 
cure has been followed in subsequent cases. It is now well established that his intention is no 
more than a factor that goes to the reasonableness of a cost of cure award.24 
What is less clear is whether the relevance attributed to intention in Ruxley is in 
substance much different from its role in Tito and Radford. This is doubtful. Whether or not 
seen as part of a wider reasonableness test, an intention to cure still seems likely to be necessary 
to a cost of cure award being made. If the promisee does not intend to cure the breach, it would 
be surprising for a cost of cure award to be found to be reasonable. Regardless of any other 
                                                          
19 [1996] A.C. 344, 373 (Lord Lloyd). 
20 Staughton LJ in Ruxley Electronics [1994] 1 W.L.R. (CA) 650, 656 also considered intention as separate from 
the requirement of reasonableness. 
21 J. O'Sullivan, 'Loss and Gain at Greater Depth: the Implications of the Ruxley Decision' in F. Rose (ed.), Failure 
of Contracts, Contractual Restitutionary and Proprietary Consequences (Oxford 1997) 1, 9. 
22 See the judgments of Lord Bridge, Lord Keith, and Lord Mustill which focus only on reasonableness without 
any mention of the promisee's intention.  
23 At 359. 
24 Eg Bovis Lend Lease Ltd (formerly Bovis Construction Limited) v RD Fire Protection Limited 2003 WL 
21917429; Birse Construction Ltd v Eastern Telegraph Company Ltd [2004] EWCH 2512; London Fire and 
Emergency Planning Authority v Halcrow Gilbert Associates Ltd [2007] EWHC 2546. 
5 
 
factors relevant to the reasonableness of awarding the cost of cure, it seems likely to be fatal. 
The reason is that, if there is no such intention, the promisee will not suffer the cost of curing 
the breach as a loss. Only when the promisee genuinely intends to cure the breach will he suffer 
this loss and do the other factors relevant to reasonableness come into play. An intention to 
cure is therefore a necessary requirement but not sufficient. 
 
3. Justifications for taking account of the promisee's intention to cure  
  
The rationale in these cases for taking account of whether or not the injured promisee intends 
to cure the breach for the purpose of assessing damages is to achieve more accurate 
compensation. His intention to cure serves to determine the extent of the loss suffered.  
Where the injured promisee has not remedied the breach, the cost of cure is merely a 
possible future loss. If he does not intend to incur this cost, then it is not a loss that he will ever 
suffer. It would be a fiction to hold otherwise. Damages are therefore irrecoverable.25 This idea 
can be found in the speech of Megarry VC in Tito where he said 'if the plaintiff … has no 
intention of applying any damages towards carrying out the work contracted for, … [i]t would 
be a mere pretence to say that this cost was a loss and so should be recoverable as damages…'.26 
Lord Lloyd in Ruxley agreed with and applied this passage. He said ‘if … Mr Forsyth had no 
intention of rebuilding the pool, he has lost nothing except the difference in value, if any’.27 
 This contrasts with the situation where the cost of cure has been incurred or the promisee 
intends to remedy the breach. The loss is real and provable. This was expressed by Megarry 
VC in Tito as follows: 'if the plaintiff establishes that the contractual work has been or will be 
done, then in all normal circumstances it seems to me that he has shown that the cost of doing 
it is, or is part of, his loss, and is recoverable as damages'.28 In this situation, the extent of the 
promisee’s loss turns on whether expending the money to cure was reasonable applying 
standard mitigation principles. 
In this way, taking account of the promisee’s intention avoids him receiving an 
undeserved windfall. If he were allowed to recover substantial damages without curing the 
breach or intending to do so, he could make an unwarranted profit'29 and be overcompensated. 
In Ruxley, for example, the House of Lords was keen to avoid the promisee recovering over 
£21,000 in damages and keeping a perfectly functional swimming pool, albeit one which failed 
to meet the contractual specification as to maximum depth.30 
Taking account of intention also avoids undue hardship being visited on the defaulting 
promisor.31 Substantial cost of cure damages where the promisee does not intend to rectify the 
defective work could overburden and punish the defaulting promisor, but it is well-established 
that damages must be compensatory, not punitive.  
 
4. Divergence from this approach 
 
There is clearly room for divergent views as to the relevance of whether or not the promisee 
intends to cure. In Ruxley itself, the majority of the Court of Appeal awarded Mr Forsyth cost 
                                                          
25 Unless the doctrine of mitigation requires the injured promisee to cure the breach. 
26 Ibid., at 332-333. 
27 Ruxley Electronics [1996] A.C. 344, 373. 
28 Ibid., at 332-333. 
29 Radford v De Froberville [1977] 1 W.L.R. 1262, 1270 (Oliver J); D. Harris, J. Phillips, and A. Ogus, 'Contract 
Remedies and the Consumer Surplus' (1979) 95 L.Q.R. 581, 586. For criticism of this argument, see B. Coote, 
'Contract Damages, Ruxley, and the Performance Interest (1997) 56 C.L.J. 537, 548-549 and 561. 
30 eg see the judgment of Lord Jauncey. 
31 Ibid., at 353 (Lord Bridge) and 373 (Lord Lloyd); E. McKendrick, 'The Common Law at Work: the Saga of 
Alfred McAlpine Construction Ltd v Panatown Ltd' (2003) 3 O.U.C.L.J. 145, 174. 
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of cure damages. Staughton LJ held that intention to repair or reinstate is irrelevant. He 
reasoned that the courts are not concerned with what the claimant does with his damages.32 
This view was also taken in two cases decided after the Court of Appeal decision but before 
the House of Lords decision in Ruxley.33 
To take account of the promisee's intention is also at odds with the approach adopted in 
other contexts, particularly sale of goods contracts, where intention is irrelevant.34 In 
Darlington Borough Council v Wiltshier Northern Ltd,35 Steyn LJ stated that there was much 
to learn as to the role of intention from the law on the sale of goods. He said 'for my part, I 
would hold that in the field of building contracts, like sale of goods, it is of no concern of the 
law what the plaintiff proposes to do with his damages… In this field English law adopts an 
objective approach to the ascertainment of damages for breach of contract'.36 
The objective approach to assessing damages in sale of goods cases generally does not 
involve considering the promisee's subjective intention.37 For instance, where fungible and non-
unique goods are not delivered in breach of contract, damages are assessed as the cost of 
obtaining substitute goods in the market.38 This is known as the 'market rule'. However, the 
promisee is not required to buy or intend to buy a substitute in the market.39 The damages claim 
crystallises regardless. What he does or intends to do following breach is irrelevant.40  
Practical and policy considerations, in particular simplicity of administration and 
certainty, have been said to justify this objective approach to damages.41 It is easy to apply and 
makes calculating the promisee's damages straightforward. This in turn simplifies and reduces 
the length of any trial of the issue.42 It is also said to facilitate and render more certain business 
transactions by ensuring that market players know where they stand in the conduct of their 
dealings.43 True the promisee can end up obtaining a windfall in some circumstances but, it has 
been argued, this is outweighed by the advantages.44 
 
B. Intention to Cure as a Necessary Requirement: the Three Party Cases 
 
The question of whether or not the promisee intends to cure the breach seems to have had even 
more significance in the context of contracts for the benefit of third parties. It has been said that 
the promisee's intention to cure is not just relevant to whether a cost of cure award will be made 
but is a necessary precondition. As such, its absence is fatal to the claim. 
                                                          
32 [1994] 1 W.L.R. 650, 656-657. 
33 Darlington Borough Council v Wiltshier Northern Ltd [1995] 1 W.L.R. 68 (CA), 75-76 (Dillon LJ) and 80 
(Steyn LJ); Dean v Ainley [1987] 1 W.L.R. 1729, 1737-1738 (Kerr LJ). See however Glidewell LJ at 1735, who 
thought that intention was necessary; Sir George Waller at 1738 was undecided on this issue. 
34 For other areas in which intention is not taken into account, see Coote (n 29) at 560-563. 
35 [1995] 1 W.L.R. 68. 
36 At 97. 
37 The courts have sometimes felt uneasy with the 'abstract' measure of damages that is the market rule and have 
declined to apply it: see Sealace Shipping Co ltd v Oceanvoice Ltd (The Alecos M) [1991] 1 Lloyd's 120. See also 
the different approaches in Bence Graphics International Ltd v Fason UK Ltd [1998] QB 87 and Slater v Hoyle 
& Smith Ltd [1920] 2 KB 11. 
38 See the Sale of Goods Act 1979, s 50(3), s 51(3) and s 53(3). 
39 M. Bridge, The Sale of Goods, (Oxford 2014) at [12.57].  
40 M. Bridge, 'The Market Rule of Damages Assessment' in D. Saidov and R. Cunnington (eds.), Contract 
Damages: Domestic and International Perspectives (Oxford 2008) 431, 433-434. Agreeing with this approach: 
D. Winterton, Money Awards in Contract Law (Oxford 2015) 196-197. See also M Bridge, ‘Market and Damages 
in Sale of Goods Cases’ (2016) 132 L.Q.R. 405 and his reply to the analysis in A. Dyson and A. Kramer, ‘There 
is No ‘Breach Date’ Rule: Mitigation, Difference in Value and Date of Assessment" (2014) 130 L.Q.R. 259 . 
41 Bridge (n 40). 
42 Ibid., at 436-439. 
43 Ibid., at 454-455. 




1. Linden Gardens and the 'broader ground' 
 
Linden Gardens Trust Ltd v Lenesta Sludge Disposals Ltd (Consolidated with St Martins 
Property Corp Ltd v Sir Robert McAlpine Ltd)45 is probably the high water mark for the 
relevance of the promisee's intention to cure to his entitlement to damages. The promisee, the 
lessee of a plot of land, engaged the promisor, a building contractor, to develop the land. For 
tax reasons, the promisee later assigned its interest in the land to a third party. It also purported 
to assign the full benefit of the construction contract but the assignment was invalid. Certain 
aspects of the work were discovered to be defective and the third party incurred remedial costs 
of around £800,000.  
The fundamental difficulty was that, on the face of things, neither the promisee nor the 
third party had a remedy. Having parted with its interest in the property prior to the breach, the 
promisee did not suffer a pecuniary disadvantage. A claim by the third party that had suffered 
a disadvantage was precluded by the failure of the assignment and the resulting absence of any 
privity with the promisor.46 The claim to damages had disappeared 'into some legal black 
hole'.47 
How to rescue the promisee from this black hole was the conundrum that came before 
the House of Lords. Its solution was to borrow an exception to the rule that the injured party 
can recover damages only in respect of his own loss from the context of carriage of goods 
contracts.48 On this basis, the promisee was able to recover substantial damages from the 
promisor, albeit subject to an obligation to account to the third party. This reasoning came to 
be known as the 'narrower ground'. 
It is to be distinguished from the explanation of Lord Griffiths, known as the 'broader 
ground'. For Lord Griffiths, there was no need to make an exception to the compensatory 
principle. Not receiving the promised performance was itself loss to the promisee, entitling him 
to claim substantial damages. On the facts, the failure to carry out the construction works in 
conformity with the contract was such a loss, for which damages should be quantified as the 
cost of remedying the defects.  
In explaining the broader ground, Lord Griffiths appeared to give considerable weight 
to the intention of the promisee to cure the breach. His speech suggests that the award of 
substantial damages should depend on the remedial work having been done or the promisee 
intending to do the work subsequently. This is most clearly discernible from his statement that 
'the court will of course wish to be satisfied that the repairs have been or are likely to be carried 
out'.49 He also said that 'in cases such as the present the person who places the contract has 
suffered financial loss because he has to spend money to give him the benefit of the bargain 
which the defendant had promised but failed to deliver'.50 This implies that, if the remedial 
work has not been undertaken already, the promisee must intend to cure the breach in order to 
be awarded damages. It makes the intention of the promisee to cure a necessary ingredient of 
the claim.51  
                                                          
45 [1994] 1 AC 85.  
46 Nor could any tortious liability be established by reason of the rule that pure economic loss is generally 
irrecoverable in tort: Murphy v Brentwood District Council [1991] 1 AC 398.  
47 GUS Property Management Ltd v Littlewoods Mail Order Stores Ltd 1982 SLT 533, 538 (Lord Keith). 
48 Dunlop v Lambert (1839) 6 CL & F 600; The Albazero [1977] AC 774. 
49 Linden Gardens [1994] 1 AC 85, 97. 
50 Ibid., at 98. 
51 This analysis seems to have been shared by Lord Keith in Linden Gardens. He said at 95: 'There is much force 
in the analysis that the party who contracted for the works to be done has suffered loss because he did not receive 
the performance he had bargained for and in order to remedy that has been required to pay for the defects to be 
put right by another builder.' 
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Lord Griffiths did not elaborate on why the right to substantial damages should depend 
on making good or intending to make good the breach. He seemed to assume that it was 
essential to the promisee's cause of action and entitlement to compensation.52 One explanation 
is that, if the remedial work has not and will not be carried out, then the promisee cannot have 
suffered any financial harm and does not deserve damages. There can be no loss and therefore 
no damages claim. To award damages in such circumstances would give the promisee an 
uncovenanted profit, enabling him to 'put the money in his own pocket'.53  
This was the view of Lord Clyde and Lord Jauncey, who were part of the majority in 
Alfred McAlpine Construction Ltd v Panatown Ltd,54 another three party case. For them, the 
promisee cannot obtain substantial damages if he has not been financially impacted by the 
breach. Intention is therefore not only relevant to the reasonableness of awarding cost of cure 
damages but an essential requirement for the promisee to establish that he has suffered loss.55  
 
2. Criticism of the role of intention to cure in Linden Gardens 
 
The apparent view of Lord Griffiths that the subjective intention of the promisee to cure the 
breach should be an essential ingredient of loss and a prerequisite to damages liability is 
controversial. It has been said to be at odds with the absence of any requirement of an intention 
to cure in the narrower ground, on which the promisee can recover losses suffered by a third 
party subject to a duty to account to him. As noted in Chitty, paradoxically, this makes the 
narrower ground broader than the broader ground.56  
It has also not been universally accepted, and in some later cases, it has been held to be 
unnecessary. For instance, in Darlington Borough Council v Wiltshier Northern Ltd,57 in which 
similar issues to those in St Martins arose, Steyn LJ said that it is 'no pre-condition to the 
recovery of substantial damages that the plaintiff does propose to undertake the necessary 
repairs'.58  
This view was also shared by Lord Goff and Lord Millett in their dissenting speeches 
in Alfred McAlpine Construction Ltd v Panatown Ltd.59 They drew upon Lord Griffiths' broader 
ground to conclude that not receiving the promised contractual performance constituted loss, 
without more and in itself.60 Breach alone was therefore sufficient for a claim to substantial 
damages, irrespective of whether the promisee had incurred or intended to incur the cost of 
curing the breach.  
Lord Goff and Lord Millett did not think that a fair reading of Lord Griffiths' opinion 
required that the claimant must carry out the work or intend to do so as essential to his cause of 
action. In their view, the correct interpretation is that the claimant suffered loss because he did 
not receive the contracted-for bargain.61 What the claimant intends to do with his damages is 
not determinative, and is no more relevant in three party cases than in two party cases. Citing 
Ruxley, they said that intention is relevant only to the reasonableness of the promisee's claim to 
                                                          
52 This is what Lord Clyde called the 'first formulation' of Lord Griffiths' approach: Alfred McAlpine [2001] 1 A.C. 
518, 533. 
53 See the speeches of Lord Clyde and Lord Jauncey in Alfred McAlpine [2001] 1 A.C. 518; Chitty on Contracts 
(n 8) at [18-063], [18-066]-[18-067]. 
54 [2001] 1 A.C. 518. 
55 Ibid., at 533ff (Lord Clyde) and 571-574 (Lord Jauncey).  
56 Chitty on Contracts (n 8) at [18-063]. 
57 [1995] 1 W.L.R. 68. 
58 Ibid., at 97 (Steyn LJ). 
59 [2001] 1 A.C. 518. 




cost of cure damages.62 They therefore disagreed with the view of Lord Clyde and Lord Jauncey 
that Lord Griffiths considered that the promisee can only recover where he has paid for 
alternative performance, intends to do so, or would account to the third party for any damages 
awarded.  
 
3. Divergent approaches and different conceptions of loss 
 
There is therefore judicial divergence on what role, if any, should be given to the intention to 
cure in these third party benefit cases. The divergence is borne out of and turns on a wider and 
more fundamental difference of view as to whether contractual performance has intrinsic value 
and what conception of 'loss' should be adopted. These issues have given rise to much debate 
in the literature63 but the relevance of intention in this context has received less attention. 
Focusing on this specific aspect, what these cases show is that those who advocate that the cure 
should have been effected or be intended for compensatory liability to arise equate loss with 
pecuniary harm. A breach of contract can only give rise to damages if it has resulted or will 
result in pecuniary detriment to the promisee.64 
Those who do not regard intention as a necessary requirement see loss as going beyond 
pecuniary harm; it is more than detriment to the promisee's overall financial position.65 
Damages should not turn on proof of financial loss, which should cease to be the touchstone of 
compensatory liability. Instead, the promisee should be recognised as having a legitimate 
interest in performance, which is worthy of remedial protection. There is therefore no need for 
him to prove that he has incurred or will incur the cost of curing the breach.  
 
4. Possible implications for two party cases 
 
The conundrum of the legal black hole and the apparent requirement in three party cases for 
the promisee to intend to cure the breach as a necessary precondition to a claim for substantial 
damages came many years after the two party cases, Tito, Radford and Ruxley. However, the 
requirement has been argued on two relatively recent occasions also to apply in that context, 
where the consideration moving from the promisor is unambiguously for the benefit of the 
promisee and there are no complications from third party involvement.  
The first such case is Giedo van der Garde BV v Force India Formula One Team Ltd 
(formerly Spyker F1 Team Ltd (England)).66 The claimants were an aspiring Formula One 
racing driver and the company managing his interests. In return for payment of $3 million, the 
defendant, a Formula One racing team, agreed, amongst other things, to permit the claimant 
driver to drive a Formula One car in testing, practising or racing for a minimum of 6,000km. 
The claimants paid the contract price but the claimant driver was given only 2,004km of 
driving.  
One of the claims advanced by the claimants67 was for damages reflecting the value of 
the promised but denied performance. The defendant relied on Linden Gardens and Panatown 
                                                          
62 Ibid., at 546-547, 556 (Lord Goff) and 592 (Lord Millett). For a criticism of this approach, see Chitty on 
Contracts (n 8) at [18-066]. 
63 For a discussion of the protection the performance interest, see for example Coote (n 29); C. Webb, 'Performance 
and Compensation: an Analysis of Contract Damages and Contractual Obligation' (2006) 26 O.J.L.S. 41. For a 
comparative perspective on this issue, see S Rowan, Remedies for Breach of Contract – A Comparative Analysis 
of the Protection of Performance (2012 OUP). 
64 See the judgments of Lord Clyde and Lord Jauncey in Alfred McAlpine [2001] 1 A.C. 518. 
65 See the judgments of Lord Goff and Lord Millett in Alfred McAlpine [2001] 1 A.C. 518. 
66 [2010] EWHC 2373.  
67 The claimants also sought the return of $2 million on the basis of total failure of consideration and, in the 
alternative, 'Wrotham Park damages'. 
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to argue that, for the claim to succeed, the claimants must have purchased or intend to purchase 
equivalent services elsewhere.68 This was said to be a necessary ingredient of a claim to recover 
substantial damages. No replacement purchase had been made and, so it was argued, damages 
should not be allowed.  
Stadlen J rejected this argument, which in his view did not apply in two party cases. 
Instead, he awarded damages representing the value of the services wrongfully withheld. The 
rationale was that the claimants had suffered loss because they purchased the right to 3,996km 
of test driving and had been deprived of its value.69 Although the judge did not expressly 
articulate or arguably even recognise this, it meant that the claimants did not seek cost of cure 
damages but rather damages for the value of the services wrongfully denied. The loss suffered 
by the claimants was not the cost of curing the breach but the value of the services that should 
have been provided by the promisor. It was therefore unsurprising that intention to remedy the 
breach was held to be irrelevant.   
A similar conclusion was reached in De Beers UK Ltd (formerly Diamond Trading Co 
Ltd) v Atos Origin IT Services UK Ltd,70 a case concerned with the non-delivery of a software 
system. The promisee sought, amongst other things, the cost of obtaining a new system. Unlike 
in Giedo, this was clearly the cost of cure measure and the promisee's intention therefore came 
into play. When the promisee failed to demonstrate an intention to obtain the system, it fell to 
be decided whether cost of cure damages could nonetheless be recovered.  
Edwards-Stuart J cited but did not delve into Ruxley, Radford and Panatown and simply 
concurred with Stadlen J's approach to Panatown in Giedo: the promisee's intention to obtain 
substitute performance was not a precondition of recovery in the two party context.71 Rather, 
the important question was whether it would be reasonable for a person in the position of the 
promisee to obtain substitute performance. He concluded thus: 'provided that it would be 
reasonable for a person in the position of [the promisee] to purchase those services elsewhere, 
it does not matter whether [the promisee] has an actual intention of doing so…'. 
De Beers therefore appears to proceed on the basis that the interpretation of Lord 
Griffiths' broader ground that intention to cure the breach is essential to damages liability has 
no application in two party cases. On one interpretation, De Beers goes further by doubting that 
intention has any relevance at all, even in two party cases. If so, this would be inconsistent with 
the approach in Ruxley that the promisee's intention to cure is one factor amongst others relevant 
to whether cost of cure damages are awarded.  
 
C. Reconciling the Different Approaches to Intention to Cure 
 
The picture to emerge from these cases is of apparently differing approaches. A number of 
questions arise. Why is it that the promisee's intention to cure has been approached in different 
ways, sometimes as necessary to damages liability but on other occasions as just one relevant 
factor amongst others? How do Tito, Radford, Ruxley, Linden Gardens, Panatown, and De 
Beers fit together? Can they be reconciled? 
On one view, there is a fault line in the authorities between the two and three party 
cases. Intention to cure has an essential role in the three party context, at least on Lord Griffiths' 
broader ground as interpreted by Lord Clyde and Lord Jauncey. Yet in two party cases, it seems 
to have reduced significance; this is somewhere on a range between relevant as one factor 
amongst others, per Ruxley, to complete irrelevance on one interpretation of De Beers.  
                                                          
68 At [457] ff. 
69At [478]. 
70 [2010] EWHC 3276 (TCC); [2011] B.L.R. 274; 134 Con. L.R. 151; [2010] Info. T.L.R. 448. 
71 Ibid., at [345]. 
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Assuming for a moment that there really is a difference in approach between the two 
and three party cases, a possible explanation is that the promisee in three party cases is not as 
deserving of damages as in two party cases. After all, it is less obvious that he has suffered 
harm. A requirement that he has carried out or intends to carry out the repairs obliges the court 
to identify a substantial loss.  
This was the explanation given by Stadlen J in Giedo. In his view, Linden Gardens and 
Panatown are not authority for the proposition that buying a replacement or intending to do so 
is a precondition to recovering substantial damages in all cases. This requirement is confined 
to three party cases and others in which there is a legal black hole. Unlike in three party cases, 
this problem does not arise in two party cases because there is contractual privity and the 
promisee benefits directly under the contract.72 
A similar distinction is drawn by commentators. In Chitty, for instance, it is said that, 
in two party cases, where the promisee has suffered harm to his person or property as a result 
of the breach, the presence of an intention to cure is only relevant to the choice between 
alternative claims to cost of cure and difference in value damages. It is not relevant to the 
existence of a claim. In three party cases, it has a more prominent role because there is no 
assumption that loss has been suffered by the promisee. It is intention that establishes the loss 
and ensures that damages are in fact destined for the benefit of the third party. As such, it is 
necessary to the very existence of the claim for substantial damages.73 
It is doubtful however that there is a sustainable basis for a distinction being drawn 
between the role of intention to cure in two and three party cases. The view expressed by Lord 
Goff and Lord Millett in Panatown that intention should have the same role in both contexts is 
to be preferred. The court has to answer the same basic question: what is the promisee's 
recoverable loss? This was the essence of the issue in Tito, Radford, Ruxley, Linden Gardens 
and Panatown. In each case, the court had to decide whether the cost of curing the breach was 
a loss to the promisee that he could recover.  
If it is correct that all of these cases are in substance examining the same question, 
namely whether the promisee's loss was the cost of remedying the breach, it ought logically to 
follow that the relevance of his intention to cure is the same. It goes directly to the existence of 
a claim to cost of cure damages. It is therefore unhelpful that intention has been seen to have 
different roles: a factor relevant in some cases and a necessary requirement in others. This 
confusion stems in part from Ruxley, where the House of Lords seemed to depart from the 
approach to intention to cure taken in Tito and Radford, steering away from intention as a 
necessary requirement towards it simply being a relevant factor. 
As already noted, it is doubtful that the role attributed to intention in Ruxley is materially 
much different from in Tito and Radford, or indeed the approach of Lord Clyde and Lord 
Jauncey in Panatown. A fly in the ointment of this analysis might seem to be the finding in De 
Beers that intention to cure is not necessary to a damages claim. However, it is a case that 
should be considered in context and with a degree of caution. Edwards-Stuart J followed the 
conclusion in Giedo, a difference in value case, even though the case before him concerned 
cost of cure and therefore was fundamentally different. It seems likely that he would have 
reached a different conclusion, if he had been guided by the cost of cure authorities, including 
Ruxley.74  
 
IV. THE IMPLICATIONS OF TAKING ACCOUNT OF THE PROMISEE'S 
INTENTION TO CURE 
 
                                                          
72 Giedo [2010] EWHC 2373 at [474]-[485]. 
73 At [18-066]-[18-068]. 
74 A. Kramer, The Law of Contract Damages (Oxford 2014) 133 criticises the decision for this very reason. 
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Whether or not the role of the injured promisee's intention to cure the breach in these various 
situations is in substance the same, as argued in the preceding paragraphs, the evident 
divergence of judicial views invites the more fundamental question: is it right in principle that 
weight is given to the promisee's intention to cure and, if so, to what extent? The apparent 
tendency of the courts to give greater weight to his intention in hard cases also raises the further 
related question of whether this is an effective tool for deciding whether the promisee is 
deserving of cost of cure damages. Alternatively, could these cases be resolved more effectively 
by other means and without reference to intention?  
 It will be shown that taking the promisee's intention to cure into account is a valuable 
tool in achieving more accurate compensation and the current approach has a number of 
advantages. However, it also has the potential to create tension with other principles relating to 
damages. The paper then moves to consider two alternative approaches that could avoid this 
tension and their potential strengths and failings.  
 
A. A Valuable Device 
 
The desire to compensate the injured promisee more accurately that is cited in the cases75 to 
justify taking account of whether or not he intends to cure the breach is commendable. If the 
objective of cost of cure damages is to hold the promisee harmless against this cost, why should 
he recover on this basis where he does not intend to cure the breach and incur it? Such an 
outcome seems intuitively wrong and inherently unmeritorious. It has the potential to put him 
in a better position than if the contract had been performed.76  
This is illustrated by London Fire and Emergency Planning Authority v Halcrow 
Gilbert Associates Ltd.77 A local fire authority contracted with an engineer to design a facility 
where firefighters could train in simulated conditions involving fire, heat and smoke. The 
facility caught fire several times as a result of the engineer's negligence, meaning that the fire 
authority had to conduct training elsewhere. It sought £4.74 million for amongst other things 
the cost of repairs. The award was refused partly on the basis that the fire authority had no 
intention to reinstate the facility. It had become apparent that, for technical reasons, the facility 
would never be suitable.78 Awarding cost of cure damages in these circumstances would have 
been incongruous and overcompensatory. 
The refusal of cost of cure damages in this situation is justifiable on the basis that 
compensation must reflect the true extent of the loss suffered. Where it is established that the 
award will not be used to obtain the bargained-for performance, no loss equating to the cost of 
curing the breach will ever be suffered. The rationale for an award that compensates the cost of 
cure therefore falls away. This is an illustration that the protection of contractual expectations, 
which is the purpose of awarding damages, is by no means absolute. It is limited by a 
requirement that the promisee intends to cure the breach, which is directly linked to the 
characterisation of loss. 
                                                          
75 See earlier the paragraph entitled 'Justifications for taking account of the promisee's intention to cure'. 
76 Some commentators have argued that cost of cure damages should not be seen as compensatory but rather 
substitutionary: eg S. Smith, ‘Substitutionary damages’ in C Rickett (ed.), Justifying Private Law Remedies 
(Oxford University Press, 2009) 93; Winterton (n 40). The currently prevailing position in English law is that 
financial loss is the touchstone of damages liability, and it is on that basis that the paper proceeds. 
77 [2007] EWHC 2546. 
78  See also Nordic Holdings Ltd v Mott MacDonald Ltd (2001) 77 Con. L.R. 88; GW Atkins Ltd v Scott (1991) 7 
Const. L.J. 215; Minscombe Properties Ltd v Sir Alfred McAlpine (1986) [1986] 2 EGLR 15; Wigsell v School for 
the Indigent Blind Corp (1881-82) L.R. 8 QBD 357; Imodco Ltd v Wimpey Major Projects Ltd Taylor Woodrow 
International Ltd (1987) 40 B.L.R. 1. 
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 Taking account of the injured promisee's intention in assessing damages also has great 
force in that it enables the court to give effect to his 'consumer surplus'.79 This is the subjective 
value of the contract to him over and above its market price, reflecting the fact that contracts 
are not always entered into for profit. Consumers in particular often bargain for pleasure and 
utility. It achieves this by recognising the subjective value that he attaches to the promised 
performance. This is not necessarily reflected in the objective market value, where the focus is 
solely on the enhancement of his financial position.  
In Radford, for instance, Oliver J recognised that the promisee subjectively valued the 
privacy that building a wall would bring, even though the market value of his land would remain 
the same. This subjective value would not be compensated by a difference in value award, 
which would be assessed objectively. Only a cost of cure award would give him full 
satisfaction.  
 
B. Tension in the Approach as to How the Award is Used 
 
Despite achieving more accurate compensation, one potential difficulty with having regard to 
the promisee's intention to cure the breach when assessing damages is that it creates tension 
with the principle that, once the award has been made, how the promisee spends it is res inter 
alios acta. It would arguably be more consistent if account was taken of the use to which 
damages are put either in all cases or none.  
This tension has been raised by judges and commentators. It is often cited as a reason 
why intention should have no relevance at all.80 As already explained, in Ruxley, Lord Jauncey 
attempted to reconcile the two principles, stating that 'intention, or lack of it, to reinstate can 
have relevance only to the reasonableness and hence to the extent of the loss which has been 
sustained. Once that loss has been established intention as to the subsequent use of the damages 
ceases to be relevant'.81 However, as Coote has noted, any reconciliation is apparent rather than 
real: the inability of the promisor to challenge the way that the award is spent should not be 
allowed to detract from the fact that an intention to reinstate must be present at the time of the 
trial.82 
Australian courts have recognised and sought to avoid this tension by consistently 
disregarding what becomes of any damages award. In Australia, it is generally irrelevant to the 
promisee's entitlement to damages. At least in defective building cases, when considering 
whether to award cost of cure or difference in value damages, the courts apply a test of 
reasonableness, as in England. The leading authority is Bellgrove v Eldridge,83 in which the 
promisor, a builder, built a house with defective foundations that caused it to be unstable. The 
High Court held that, in such cases, the measure of damages is generally the cost of remedying 
the defects, provided that the remedial work is necessary to achieve conformity with the 
contract and reasonable. Whether the work is necessary and reasonable is a question of fact.  
 Unlike in England, the subjective intention of the promisee as to how he will use his 
damages is generally not taken into account. In Bellgrove, the High Court expressly stated that 
the promisee's intention to rebuild is irrelevant to the measure of damages. Dixon CJ, Webb 
and Taylor JJ, delivering the judgment of the court, said: 'it was suggested during the course of 
argument that if the respondent … is satisfied, she may or may not demolish the existing house 
                                                          
79 Burrows (n 5) 223; Harris, Phillips, and Ogus (n 29) at 582. 
80 eg Dean v Ainley [1987] 1 W.L.R. 1729, 1737-1738 (Kerr LJ); Coote (n 29) at 562. Not everyone accepts that 
this tension exists. For instance, Burrows (n 5) at 222 sees this as a misleading objection because the courts 
commonly have to assess the likely future costs of the claimant on the basis that damages will cover these costs. 
81 Ruxley Electronics [1996] A.C. 344, 359.  
82 Coote (n 29) at 563. 
83 (1954) 90 C.L.R. 613. 
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and re-erect another. If she does not, it is said, she will still have a house together with the cost 
of erecting another one. To our mind this circumstance is quite immaterial'. The immateriality 
of the promisee's intention was 'but one variation of a feature which so often presents itself in 
the assessment of damages in cases where they must be assessed once and for all'.84  
This approach has been reaffirmed by senior Australian courts on several occasions. An 
example is the decision of the Full Court of the Supreme Court of South Australia in De Cesare 
v Deluxe Motors Pty Ltd.85 Doyle CJ said that 'the award of [damages for rectification of 
building defects] is not conditional upon the [claimant] having first done the necessary work, 
upon the [claimant] undertaking to the court to do so or upon the [claimant] proving that the 
[claimant] will do so'.86 Similarly, in Unique Building Property Ltd v Brown,87 another decision 
of the same court, Sulan J held that 'the measure of damages is the difference between the 
contract and the cost of making it conform to the contract with consideration of the 
reasonableness of what is necessary to conform to the contract. This does not require 
consideration to be given as to the future intention of the respondents as to whether they 
subsequently wish to continue with the contracted building, or even whether they wish to sell 
the site'.88 
The Australian decisions cite several other reasons for taking no account of how the 
promisee intends to spend his damages award, aside from the general principle that the courts 
are unconcerned with how damages are used. One is that the test of reasonableness is objective; 
it should not be affected by the subjective intention of the promisee or the likelihood of the 
work being done.89 It has also been said to be no concern of the promisor what contracts the 
promisee makes after the breach.90  
 
C. Resolving the Tension 
 
The tension between the approach in English law to what the injured promisee intends to do 
and what he actually does with his damages award could be addressed in two alternative ways: 
the first is for the court to disregard the promisee's intention altogether when assessing 
damages; the second is for the court not only to take account of how he intends to use his award 
but also to exercise jurisdiction over what he actually does with it. 
 
1. Disregarding intention to cure 
 
The first possibility is to follow the Australian approach. This would mean that the availability 
of cost of cure damages would be limited solely by a requirement of reasonableness. No weight 
would be given to whether or not the injured promisee intends to cure the breach. 
Reasonableness would be the main device to prevent the promisee from obtaining an 
undeserved windfall and the contract-breaker being punished. This would mirror the approach 
where the promisee has already cured the breach by the time of the trial. In that scenario, the 
court considers whether the steps taken to cure the breach were reasonable and the promisee 
                                                          
84 Ibid., at 616. 
85 (1996) 67 S.A.S.R. 28. 
86 Ibid., at 30. 
87 [2010] S.A.S.C. 106. 
88 Ibid., at [94]; However, it has been argued that, in very exceptional circumstances, Bellgrove will be displaced 
'if there are supervening circumstances that show with substantial certainty' that the rectification will not happen: 
see Scott Carver Pty Ltd v SAS Trustee Corp [2005] NSWCA 462, [44] (Hodgson JA); Central Coast Leagues 
Ltd v Gosford City Council (unreported,  Supreme Court, NSW, Giles CJ at CL, 9 June 1998); Westpoint 
Management Ltd v Chocolate Factory Apartments Ltd [2007] NSWCA 253.  
89 De Cesare v Deluxe Motors Pty Ltd (1996) 67 S.A.S.R. 28. 
90 Director of War Service Homes v Harris (1968) QR. 275.  
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has successfully discharged his duty to mitigate. Essentially the same enquiry would be made 
where the promisee has not already cured the breach.91  
The reasonableness test, as applied in relation to cost of cure damages, is broad and 
encompasses many factors other than whether or not the injured promisee intends to cure the 
breach.92 They combine to verify that the loss is genuine and ensure that the promisee is not 
exploiting the breach to secure an 'unwarranted profit'.93 The objective is to achieve the best 
possible balance between the interests of the promisee and those of the promisor, protecting the 
former without overburdening the latter.  
The factors include the level of disproportion between the cost of the cure and its benefit 
to the injured promisee,94 the extent and seriousness of the defect and its consequences,95 and 
whether the remedial work is necessary to achieve the promised performance.96 The more 
serious and extensive the defect, the more reasonable a cost of cure award will be.97 On the 
other hand, the greater the disproportion between the cost of cure and the benefit to the 
promisee, the less reasonable it will be. The disproportion must be significant before a cost of 
cure award is found to be unreasonable. As Lord Mustill said in Ruxley, the cost of 
reinstatement must be 'wholly disproportionate'. This is because the courts try to honour and 
give effect to the bargain of the parties: 'pacta sunt servanda'.98 
Other factors relevant to the reasonableness test include the nature and purpose of the 
contract99 and the injured promisee's own subjective preferences.100 For instance, the courts 
have regard to whether the contract is commercial in nature or for a purpose which does not 
have economic value such as a recreation. The promisee's predilections and tastes are thereby 
taken into account, as is the consumer surplus.101 To that extent, account is taken of the 
promisee's intention, albeit this is measured at the time that the contract is formed rather than 
the time of the breach or the trial.  
Applying these factors to Ruxley and Radford, the outcomes would most likely have 
been the same, even if no account had been taken of the injured promisee's subjective intention 
at the time of trial. In Ruxley, many factors pointed towards the cost of cure being unreasonable. 
The defect was minor in that the difference in depth was only slight. Mr Forsyth's main reason 
for specifying the depth in the contract was to enable him, as a tall man, to dive safely;102 it was 
not essential for any other purpose. However, the pool as built was found by the trial judge to 
be safe for diving, the contractor having adduced evidence that the depth was well within 
national safety recommendations. It was therefore found that there was a significant 
                                                          
91 Whether the test of reasonableness is the same as the test applied in the context of mitigation is a point of 
disagreement. Oliver J in Radford [1977] 1 W.L.R. 1262, at 1284 thought that whether it is reasonable for the 
promisee to incur the cost of reinstatement was '[a question] of mitigation'. This view is shared by a number of 
commentators: Kramer (n 74) at 119ff; Burrows (n 5) at 219ff. Contra Ruxley Electronics [1996] A.C. 344, 369-
70 (Lord Lloyd). Regardless of whether the tests are identical, they share the same objective, which is not to 
overburden the defaulting promisor with losses that he has not caused. 
92 G. McMeel, 'Common Sense on Cost of Cure' [1995] L.M.C.L.Q. 456, 458-459; A. Loke, 'Cost of Cure or 
Difference in Value – Towards a Sound Choice in the Basis for Quantifying Expectation Damages' (1996) 10 
J.C.L. 189. 
93 Radford [1977] 1 W.L.R. 1262, 1270 (Oliver J). 
94 Ruxley Electronics [1996] A.C. 344, 353 (Lord Keith) and 367, 369 (Lord Lloyd). 
95 Ruxley Electronics [1996] A.C. 344, 357-358 (Lord Jauncey); Imodco Ltd v Wimpey Major Projects Ltd Taylor 
Woodrow International Ltd (1987) 40 BLR 1. 
96 Dean v Ainley [1987] 1 W.L.R. 1729, 1735 (Glidewell LJ). 
97 Ruxley Electronics [1996] A.C. 344, 358 (Lord Jauncey). 
98 Ibid, at 361-360. 
99 Ibid, at 358 (Lord Jauncey); Radford [1977] 1 W.L.R. 1262, 1270 (Oliver J). 
100 Ibid; see also Channel Island Ferries Ltd v Cenargo Navigation Ltd [1994] 2 Lloyd's Rep 161, 166-167 (Philips 
J); GW Atkins Ltd v Scott (1991) 7 Const. L.J. 215, 221-222 (Ackner LJ).  
101 Coote (n 29) at 559. 
102 Ruxley Electronics [1994] 1 W.L.R. (CA) 650, 652 (Staughton LJ). 
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disproportion between, on the one hand, the benefit to be achieved by curing the breach and 
rebuilding the pool, which would have been minor, and the cost, which was high. A reasonable 
man in Mr Forsyth's position would not have taken this course. 
In Radford, the purpose of the boundary wall that the promisor had agreed to build was 
to protect the privacy of the injured promisee's land in an acceptable architectural style.103 
Although there was a significant disparity between the cost of cure and the difference in value 
measures of damages, the subjective benefit to the promisee of protecting the privacy of his 
land was not out of proportion to the cost of cure. Building a wall was the only means of 
achieving this purpose. 
Apart from achieving consistency with the principle that the injured promisee's use of 
his damages is res inter alios acta, focusing on reasonableness without having regard to the 
promisee's intention would also have the advantage of avoiding potential evidential uncertainty. 
Trying to ascertain the subjective intention of the promisee can be speculative. In Tito, Megarry 
VC sought to alleviate the problem by holding that it was sufficient for the court to determine 
his probable intention,104 but even this may be difficult and involve guesswork. A corollary is 
uncertainty for the defaulting promisor as to his potential exposure. 
A multitude of evidential factors have been taken into account in determining whether 
the injured promisee actually intends to cure the breach. One is the amount of time that he has 
left the defect unremedied105 and whether he could have afforded to pay for the cure during that 
time.106 Another is whether he has taken steps or made plans to cure the breach, for example 
by seeking or better still obtaining tenders for the remedial work from alternative contractors 
or drawing up specifications.107 Further relevant factors include whether the defective property 
has a special value to the promisee,108 and whether curing the breach is necessary109 and still 
achievable.110  
It is possible that these evidential factors will have unsatisfactory implications in some 
cases. As an example, for the injured promisee's prospects of success to depend only on when 
his claim comes before the court and the steps that he has (or has not) taken in the intervening 
period would be unattractive. It might lead to different outcomes, depending on relatively 
arbitrary factors such as when he gets round to rectifying the breach or bringing his claim. Yet 
there could be many valid reasons for his delay. He might have needed or preferred to receive 
the damages payment before undertaking the work. Even if he was able to do the work 
immediately, he might have opted for perfectly legitimate reasons to spend his money in other 
ways or not at all. It may be that he delayed commencing proceedings to develop his evidential 
case or due to protracted pre-action correspondence or negotiations with the promisor. A further 
cause of delay that would hardly be unusual is that, when commenced, the proceedings 
progressed slowly. All or most of these issues should be surmountable with appropriate 
evidence from the promisee but they nonetheless present possible pitfalls for the unwary. 
Disregarding his intended use of his damages award should avoid many of them altogether.   
 
2. Taking account of intention: conditional cost of cure awards and undertakings 
 
                                                          
103 Radford [1977] 1 W.L.R. 1262, 1269. 
104 Tito v Waddell (no. 2) [1977] Ch 106, 333. 
105 Nordic Holdings Ltd (2001) 77 Con. L.R. 88, [106]; London Fire and Emergency Planning Authority [2007] 
EWHC 2546, [633]ff. 
106 Ibid; Birse Construction Ltd 2007] EWHC 2546, at [52]. 
107 London Fire and Emergency Planning Authority [2007] EWHC 2546, [633]ff; Nordic Holdings Ltd (2001) 77 
Con. L.R. 88, [107]. 
108 Ward v Cannock Chase District Council [1986] Ch 546, 577 (tort). 
109 Nordic Holdings Ltd (2001) 77 Con. L.R. 88, [106]. 
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Another possible way of avoiding tension between the approaches to what the injured promisee 
intends to do and what he actually does with his award would be for both to be relevant to his 
entitlement to damages. This would potentially achieve more accurate compensation not only 
at the time of trial when damages are assessed, but also after the award has been made.  
In some cases, there is a risk that the damages award, once made, will be rendered over-
compensatory by subsequent events. This is illustrated by the decision of the Irish Supreme 
Court in Dublin Corp v Building and Allied Trade Union,111 which arose out of a compulsory 
purchase order rather than a breach of contract. Dublin Corporation was a road authority 
responsible for widening a road. To this end, it compulsorily purchased part of the site of a 
building known as the Bricklayers' Hall, which was owned by the Bricklayers' Guild and had a 
fine cut stone facade. One possible measure of compensation was the value of the entire 
building. The other was the much higher cost of purchasing only the part of the building needed 
to widen the road, together with the cost of removing the facade and reinstating it on the reduced 
site. The Guild wished to keep the facade and intended to reinstate it and, on this basis, was 
awarded the higher sum. 
Following the award but before the conveyance took place, the Guild changed its mind. 
It demolished the hall and made no attempt to rebuild it or reinstate the facade. The Irish 
Supreme Court refused to reassess the compensation award in the light of the changed 
circumstances. Keane J, delivering the judgment of the court, held that the principle of res 
judicata gave the Guild a complete defence; the Corporation was estopped from revisiting the 
issue. He said that the 'interest of the public is that finality is given precedence by the law over 
the injustices which inevitably sometimes result'.112 The Guild was able to keep the additional 
amount of damages and ended up making a substantial profit. This neatly demonstrates how a 
damages award that is reasonable when made can be rendered over-compensatory by 
subsequent events.  
This outcome could have been avoided if the court had been able to exercise jurisdiction 
over how the money was spent. One way for this to be done would be for the court to order that 
the right to cost of cure damages is conditional upon the injured promisee using the award to 
remedy the breach. To the extent that the promisee does not do so, the condition would fail, 
entitling the promisor to demand repayment. If repayment was not forthcoming voluntarily, the 
promisor would be entitled to bring the matter back before the court and seek an order that the 
damages be repaid. This would prevent the promisee from obtaining a windfall, achieving a 
purer form of compensation which, at least for the defaulting party, would seem fairer. 
This solution is not without problems. It has the potential to reopen disputes that have 
already been litigated to judgment and thereby create uncertainty for both parties. The precise 
grounds on which repayment could be sought would need to be established.113 Clawing back 
money that has already been spent may be difficult. For instance, the injured promisee might 
have dissipated the money and be impecunious. To ascertain or police what the promisee has 
done with it would in some situations put the defaulting promisor to considerable expense and 
inconvenience. A right to repayment would also turn him into the promisee's unsecured 
creditor114 and expose him to the risk of insolvency of the promisee.  
A possible answer to the argument that conditional awards would bring uncertainty is 
that this would not arise where the injured promisee spends his award on curing the breach. 
Uncertainty could also be minimised by restricting conditional awards only to those cases in 
which the promisee's intention to use the award to cure the breach is taken into account by the 
                                                          
111 [1996] 2 ILRM; E O'Dell, 'Restitution and Res Judicata in the Irish Supreme Court' (1997) 113 L.Q.R. 245. 
112 Ibid, at 556.  
113 Possibly on the basis of unjust enrichment: ibid. 
114 Unless the money is held on trust (eg a quistclose type of trust, see Barclays Bank v Quistclose Investments Ltd 
[1970] AC 567)) or put into an escrow account pending the promisee curing the breach. 
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court at the assessment stage. Since the purpose of taking his intention into account is 
presumably to achieve more accurate compensation, there is an argument for staying true to 
this purpose after the award has been made and requiring that any damages not spent curing the 
breach be returned.   
Another possibility would be for the courts to allow or even require the injured promisee 
to give an undertaking that he will spend the damages on curing the breach.115 Such an 
undertaking would most likely be given to the court. The defaulting promisor would therefore 
be unable to sue for repayment. Instead, as with any undertaking given to court, it would be 
enforceable by contempt of court proceedings.116 The seriousness of being in contempt and the 
solemnity of giving an undertaking should provide the court and the defaulting promisor some 
assurance that the promisee is serious about spending his damages on curing the breach. 
That there is potentially a role for undertakings in this context has already been argued 
in the cases. In an attempt to demonstrate the genuineness of their intention to cure the breach, 
some claimants have offered to undertake that, if awarded cost of cure damages, they would 
spend their award on the cure. There has been inconsistency in the cases as to whether such an 
undertaking should be accepted. Both Megarry VC in Tito and Oliver J in Radford were 
receptive to the idea. Megarry VC thought that 'if the circumstances fail to indicate sufficiently 
that the work will be done, the court might accept an undertaking by the plaintiff to do the 
work; … this…would surely "compel fixity of intention"'. 117 In Radford, the promisee offered 
an undertaking. Oliver J thought that it was unnecessary as the promisee had clearly established 
an intention to cure the breach but it appeared to comfort him that the intention was genuine.118  
However, in Ruxley, the House of Lords seemed less convinced. It declined to accept 
the undertaking that Mr Forsyth had offered that, if awarded cost of cure damages, he would 
rebuild the pool to the contractually agreed depth. The main reason was the prospect that, by 
giving the undertaking, he would effectively be inflating his damages award. Lord Lloyd said: 
'does Mr Forsyth’s undertaking to spend any damages which he may receive on rebuilding the 
pool make any difference? Clearly not. He cannot be allowed to create a loss, which does not 
exist, in order to punish the defendants for their breach of contract'.119  
Allowing the injured promisee to undertake that he will spend his damages award curing 
the breach would most likely give rise to similar practical problems as conditional awards. It 
also has the potential to lead to enforcement problems and satellite litigation.120 The defaulting 
promisor would have to police compliance with the undertaking, which could be difficult and 
put him to considerable inconvenience and expense. If the undertaking were breached, he would 
have to make an application to court121 and adduce evidence of the promisee's failure. This 
would need to be particularly convincing given that breach would potentially put the promisee 
in contempt of court. It may therefore be an unattractive solution in practice.  
   
 
V. CONCLUSION 
                                                          
115 Proposed by Webb (n 63).  
116 A. Zuckerman, Civil Procedure (London 2003) [22.74]-[22.91]. 
117 Tito v Waddell (no. 2) [1977] Ch 106, 333. 
118 Radford [1977] 1 W.L.R. 1262, 1284 (Oliver J.); see also Dean v Ainley [1987] 1 W.L.R. 1729, 1735 (Glidewell 
LJ). 
119 Ruxley Electronics [1996] A.C. 344, 373 (Lord Lloyd). See also Scullion v Bank of Scotland (t/a Colleays) 
[2010] EWHC 2253 at [68]-[80]: the courts have no jurisdiction to extract an undertaking from the promisee to 
compel him to spend his damages award in a particular way. 
120 Burrows (n 5) 220; E. McKendrick, 'Breach of Contract and the Meaning of Loss' [1999] C.L.P. 37 at 50; For 
arguments in favour of enforcing such undertakings, see A. Phang, 'Subjectivity, Objectivity and Policy – 
Contractual Damages in the House of Lords' [1996] J.B.L. 362. 




The courts have avoided concerning themselves with the way that the injured promisee uses 
his damages award once it has been made. They have however taken account of how he intends 
to use it in deciding whether or not to order damages on the cost of cure basis. This has been 
perceived to facilitate fairer outcomes in hard cases such as those arising out of contracts for 
the benefit of third parties and where the choice of measure of damages is contentious.  
Taking the subjective intention of the injured promisee into account in the assessment 
of damages has many advantages and is a rational solution. It can however lead to tension with 
other principles in the compensation process. At least in theory, this could be resolved by two 
alternative options: ceasing to take account of how the promisee intends to use his damages 
when determining the availability of cost of cure damages or, alternatively, extending the 
court's jurisdiction to making sure that he applies the award to cure the breach.  
The former solution has been thought to be attractive in Australia and would merit 
consideration in England. It involves disregarding whether or not the injured promisee intends 
to cure the breach when assessing damages. The test of reasonableness would operate in the 
same way as at present but without any account being taken of the promisee's intention or 
otherwise to cure. As well as overcoming any perceived tension with the principle that the 
courts do not police how damages awards are used, it would avoid the potential for evidential 
uncertainty that could result from a need to prove the promisee's subjective intention. It would 
also have the advantage of still achieving fair compensation and at a same time putting an end 
to the divergence in approach as to the relevance of the promisee's intention to cure that can be 
discerned in the case law. 
 
 
 
